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Implementing a VER Definition:
Practical Concerns About the Bundle
of Sticks, the Corners of the Deed,
and Shifting Burdens
MARIANNE D. MASON*

This paper is premised on the notion that it will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM)l to promulgate a regulation defining the term "valid existing rights ' 2 which entirely
satisfies all the constitutional and policy concerns identified during the thirteen-year history of definitional attempts.' Accordingly, this paper will discuss the practical and administrative
concerns attendant upon the people in the various state regulatory authorities who will have to implement whatever it is that
Congress meant when it said "subject to valid existing
rights . . ."4
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
("SMCRA") does not define the term "valid existing rights"
(VER). However, 30 C.F.R. Section 761.5 (1979) did define the
term, in part, as:
(1)Those property rights in existence on August 3, 1977, that
were created by a legally binding conveyance, lease, deed,
contract or other document which authorizes the applicant to

* Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Counsel to the Maryland Department of
Natural Resources. The author wishes to express her gratitude for the extensive research
assistance received from the COALEX service of the Interstate Mining Compact Commission. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily
reflect the position of the State of Maryland, any of its agencies, or of the Maryland
Attorney General.
I OSM, a unit of the U.S. Department of the Interior, is the administrative agency
charged with administering the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
(SMCRA), Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988)).
2 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (e) (1988).
1 See, e.g., In re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. I, 14 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1083 (D. D.C., 1980); Notice of Proposed Action, 47 Fed. Reg. 25,278
(1982) Notice of Final Action, 48 Fed. Reg. 41,312 (1983).
4 SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988).
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produce coal by a surface coal mining operation; and
(2)The person proposing to conduct surface coal mining operations on such lands either
(i) Had been validly issued, on or before August 3, 1977,
all State and Federal permits necessary to conduct such operations on those lands, or
(ii) Can demonstrate to the regulatory authority that the
coal is both needed for, and immediately adjacent to, an
ongoing surface coal mining operation for which all permits
were obtained prior to August 3, 1977.
The 1979 definition of VER was challenged by various plaintiffs on four grounds in In re: Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation I: (1) Whether Congress intended to preserve
private property rights recognized under State law; (2) whether
the Secretary of the Interior's construction of valid existing rights
is an unconstitutional taking of property proscribed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) whether the "all permits" test
is arbitrary and capricious; and (4) whether the "needed for and
adjacent" test unduly expands the scope of the VER exception.
U.S. District Judge Flannery held on each of the four challenges,
respectively, that: (1) "existing State law may be applied to
interpret whether the document relied upon established valid
existing rights."; 6 (2) The takings challenge was premature because no party could complain of an unconstitutional application
of the definition; 7 (3) An operator who applies for all permits,
but fails to receive one through government delay, "engenders
the same investments and expectations as an operator who timely
receives all permits" ' and accordingly, a "good faith attempt to
obtain all permits before the August 3, 1977 cutoff date" would
suffice to meet the "all permits" test; 9 and (4) that the "need
and adjacent" test is a rational method of allowing mining
"when denial would gravely diminish the value of the entire
mining operation, thereby constituting a taking under Supreme
0
Court declarations."
In the Preamble to the 1979 Final Rules," OSM cited the
legislative history of SMCRA as support for the premise that

6

14 Env't Rep. Cas. 1083 (D. D.C., 1980).
Id. at 1090, as conceded by the Secretary of the Interior.
Id. at 1091.
Id.

9 Id.

o 14 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1092.
44 Fed. Reg. 14,902-15,903 (1979).
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Congress wanted to avoid any takings in the implementation of
Section 522(e). OSM stated that it endeavored to "determine the
point at which payment would be required because a taking had
occurred, then to define [VER] in those terms, i.e., those rights
'' 2
which cannot be affected without paying compensation.
OSM also relied upon legislative history of VER in which
Congress cited and discussed United States v. Polino.13 In Polino, the Court examined a deed conveying coal for language
granting the right to extract the mineral by surface mining methods. OSM noted that the Polino decision does not address whether
a restriction on mining coal by surface mining methods might
constitute a taking for which compensation would be owed;
however, the concepts of "the nature of the right being conveyed
between private parties and the method of interpreting the document which conveys that right" were incorporated into the
1979 VER definition. 14 OSM also analyzed other "takings"
cases, 5 and seized upon the distinction between an owner's value
in an ongoing operation which must be halted, versus the value
that an owner has paid for some future operation that will be
restricted. Recognizing that takings jurisprudence shows less
sympathy for an owner who is denied a future opportunity to
fully exploit his or her property interest although based on an
expectation that the property would be available for development, OSM was able to justify its "need for and adjacent," and
''all permits" tests.' 6

A point central to today's continuing debate about VER is
one that OSM acknowledged in the 1979 Preamble, namely that
SMCRA changed the atmosphere surrounding the extraction of
coal. Congress made it clear that surface coal mining on any
private or Federal land is "not an absolute right,' 7 but may
occur only after approval by a regulatory authority which has
determined that reclamation to the standards of SMCRA can be
achieved. "Thus, at least as of enactment of the Act, landowners
no longer have an unconditional right to mine. OSM therefore

,2Id. at 14,992.
131 F.Supp. 772 (N.D. W.Va. 1955).
14 44 Fed. Reg. at 14,992.
1144 Fed. Reg. at 14,992, citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. City of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
16 Id.
17 44 Fed. Reg. at 14,993.
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believes that the definition of VER should take into account
both the new regulatory framework created by the Act and the
fact that the Act applies VER to both private and Federal
8
lands.'
OSM decided that VER had to be determined on a case-bycase basis, because it is a site-specific concept. However, OSM
rejected the option of not defining VER, and decided that the
concept should be defined "in order to achieve a measure of
consistency" in interpretation.' 9
In 1983, OSM turned the concept of "consistency in interpretation" on its head by adopting a new definition of VER
intended to allow the various regulatory authorities to "conform
the determination of valid existing rights to the continuing development of takings law in the courts." ' 20 In an attempt to
"provide states with new flexibility," ' 2 1 the 1983 final rule
amended the definition of VER to reject a "bright line" definition in favor of a requirement for case-by-case examination of
the constitutionality of application of the mining prohibition.
OSM decided that there was "insufficient legal basis" for defining VER in terms of any class of circumstances, because the
courts had been unable to prescribe set formulas for determining
whether a taking had occurred.2 2 This proposal left the VER
determination up to the various state regulatory authorities,
based upon the applicant's submission of information to the
state, including names of owners of mineral rights, copies of the
conveyance, leases, deeds, copies of any permits, and land ownership information. 23 The state administrators would then review
the information to determine "whether the application of the
prohibition in [Section] 522(e) would result in a taking under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution."2
The 1983 VER regulation was remanded to the Secretary by
Judge Flannery in 1985 in In re: Permanent Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation (II).21 The court held that the broad tak-

Is Id.

9 Id. (emphasis added).
48 Fed. Reg. 41,312 (1983).
IId.
IId.
23 Id.

Id.
2'22 Env't Rep. Cas. 1557 (D. D.C., 1985).
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ings standard represented such a significant departure from the
three options described in the proposed rule in 1982,26 that a
new notice and comment period was necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 27 In response
to the court's order, on November 20, 1986 OSM suspended the
definition. OSM thereafter took the position that the 1986 suspension had the effect of restoring the VER test in use before
the 1983 definition was promulgated. 2s This has indeed been the
effect of the suspension in most of the states with approved
programs.29
In addition to its prohibition of issuance or renewal of any
permit for surface coal mining operations in the congressionallymandated areas,30 the Maryland Annotated Code, Natural Resources Article, Section 7-505(b)(2)(ii), prohibits surface coal
mining operations "[w]ithin the Yougiogheny River scenic corridor, notwithstanding any other provision of law." Part of the
Yougiogheny River has been designated as a wild river under
the State's Scenic and Wild Rivers program.' Since 1975, Maryland law has expressly prohibited "mining of any minerals by
the strip or open pit method" in the Scenic Corridor of the Wild
River segment of the Youghiogheny.3 2 There is an exception for
areas within the scenic corridor which have previously been
mined and are not reclaimed.3 3
In 1988, OSM again proposed to change the definition of
VER.3 4 For the standards for VER in 30 C.F.R. Section
761.5(a)(2), OSM proposed two options: First, under the "own-

47 Fed. Reg. 25,278 (1982).
1,22 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1565.
11See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,961 (1986) (suspending regulation) and 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374
(1988) (recognizing restoration of the pre-1983 VER definition).
The following states had enacted regulations which mirrored or closely followed
the 1979-80 modified all permits test as of March 1, 1990: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and West Virginia. States
with other versions of a VER definition as of March, 1990 include: Illinois, with a
"takings" test approved January 4, 1989, Virginia, with a "takings" test effective June
16, 1988; and Wyoming, with a "takings" test effective November 24, 1986. (Data from
COALEX).
3 SMCRA §§ 522(e)(3), (4), and (5), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1272(e)(3), (4), and (5). There
are no mineable coal seams in § 522(e)(1) or (2) areas in Maryland.
1,Maryland Annotated Code, Natural Resources Article § 8-408 (1990).
32 Id.
33

Id.

14

Preamble to Proposed Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988).
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ership and authority option," a regulatory authority would find
that VER exists if the person can demonstrate both ownership
of the coal and the right, as determined by the laws of the State,
to extract the coal by the method intended." This option would
not require applicants to demonstrate that they had applied for
necessary permits by any particular date. Rather, VER would be
a function of State property rights. Under the second "good
faith-all permits" option, OSM proposed that VER exists if the
person desiring to conduct surface coal mining operations has
obtained, or has made a good faith effort to obtain, all necessary
36
permits as of the effective date of the mining prohibition.
The legislative history of SMCRA cited by OSM in the
Preamble3 7 relies heavily on United States v. Polino,8 in which
the court examined "as a matter of law, whether or not a
reservation of coal and mining rights contained in a certain deed
carried with it the legal right to employ mining methods known
as 'strip mining."' 3 9 The court examined a June 28, 1917 deed
conveying 1,120 acres in West Virginia to the United States.
Subsequently, the government set aside part of that acreage
which eventually was incorporated into the Monongahela National Forest. The deed from the grantor to the United States
reserved mineral and mining rights including "the right to mine
and remove minerals from the above-described land ... provided that the mining and removal of minerals so reserved shall
be done strictly in accordance with rules provided by the Secretary of Agriculture."4° When the grantor's successor in interest
attempted to remove the reserved coal by a strip mining operation, the United States contended that strip mining was not
allowed under the reservation of minerals in the 1917 deed.
The Polino court turned to West Virginia cases which interpreted the language of severance deeds, and the usage and custom of the minerals industry at the time of the various deeds.
The court found that, in 1917, there were no coal stripping
operations in the county where the lands were located, and that
when the government acquired such lands, "it is obvious that

35

Id.

36

Id. at 52,378.

17

38
39

See supra note 36.
131 F.Supp. at 772; See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
Id.

IId. at 773.
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both parties to that deed knew the purposes for which the United
States was acquiring the land and the uses for which it was
intended to be put." ' 41 Because the court determined the inten-

tions of the parties to the 1917 deed, it was able to come up
with the rationale that the government acquired the lands for
forestry purposes, that this purpose of acquisition was known
to both parties, and accordingly that the successor in interest
did not acquire the right under its lease to remove the coal by
strip mining.
The Preamble 42 cited Polino43 as support for the notion that
the right to conduct a particular mining operation must be
determined in accordance with the case law from the state where
the mining is contemplated. Under the ownership and authority
option proposed by OSM, state regulatory authorities would of
necessity be making property rights determinations. For example,
the regulatory authority would have to determine whether the
relevant conveyances (deeds, leases, rights of entry) have given
the applicant all of the necessary rights to strip mine the coal,
or whether the applicant has obtained only the right to extract
the coal by underground mining. The ownership and authority
option thus puts the burden squarely on the shoulders of the
state regulatory authorities, and requires them to adjudicate
property rights as between surface and mineral owners. Even
OSM acknowledges that the right to mine via certain methods
"is an issue of property rights, and would be evaluated through
consideration of the provisions of state property law as they
applied to a particular situation."" In focusing on the practical
aspects of implementing a VER definition, OSM needs to remember that a state administrator may not be the best person
to decide issues requiring detailed knowledge of state court decisions and state constitutions.
OSM's expressed intention in proposing the ownership and
authority test was to accommodate Congress' concern about
takings of property without compensation. 45 The determination
whether a particular action effects a taking in contravention of
the federal or state constitution is an extraordinarily complex

4

Id. at 775.

41 See supra note 36.
41 131 F.Supp. at 772.
53 Fed. Reg. 52,374 (1988).
Id. at 52,377.
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and case-specific undertaking for each court faced with the
question. It is reasonable to assume that, if Option 1 or something like it is selected, each time a VER application is presented
to a state regulatory authority (RA), the RA would have to turn
to counsel for advice on the complex property determinations
required. Under this scenario, the agency counsel or Attorney
General's Office in each state would be called upon to make
constitutional pronouncements about the effect of the application of an agency's regulation.
By tying the ownership and authority option to the "takings"
option, OSM will force the state RA to make essentially the
same determinations under the ownership and authority test as
under the takings test. This approach is overly burdensome for
state administrative personnel. Moreover, applicable state law
may prevent some RAs from determining property rights as
between two private parties. Even if RAs are not forbidden
outright by constitution or law from making private property
allocations between two private parties, sound public policy dictates that states should not be making these kinds of determinations. It's simply not the state's business. Rather, the courts
should decide constitutional issues.
State regulatory authorities would, I submit, find it impossible to apply with any scintilla of consistency the Option 1 test.
They would examine previous court decisions in an attempt to
discern the particular state's "test" for what constitutes the right
to mine, and attempt to divine what was the "usage or custom
at the time and place" where the deed or conveyance was executed. The latter endeavor requires a large measure of historical
hindsight; were bulldozers ripping up the surface of the earth
when the contract or deed was executed? Were draglines prowling the pits? After determining the usage or custom at the time
and place, then the RA must also look to see whether the rights
claimed by the VER applicant were "contemplated by the parties." How many "sticks" did the VER applicant acquire in the
"bundle" of property rights conveyed to it in the relevant deeds
or leases? '
Case law illustrates the complexity of decisions which implicate state property rights. 46 In C&T Evangelinos v. Division of
Reclamation,47 the Ohio Division of Reclamation issued a deep
- See, e.g., Polino, supra notes 16 and 40 and accompanying text.
47Slip Op. 1989 WL 109497 (Ohio App. 1989).
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mining permit over the objection of the surface owners. The
case turned upon the interpretation of an exception in the deed
by which the surface owners obtained title to their property, and
whether this exception constituted a knowing waiver of the restriction against mining within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling.
The coal company claimed that it did not need a written waiver,
because it had VER. The surface owners argued that their predecessors in title could not have waived the 300 foot restriction,
because the deed that severed the mineral rights from the surface
was executed in 1965, substantially before the 300 foot restriction
became effective. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the surface owners' argument by looking at the 1965 deed and finding
that the deed was sufficient to put the surface owners' predecessors in title on notice that they were waiving certain rights,
including the right to protect their residence in the event that
the mineral owner decided to extract the coal. The Court found
that "[tihe fact that mining regulations enacted in 1977 provided
specific methods by which this waiver could occur does not
change this basic fact. The [applicant's predecessors in title]
were not given the right to protect their residence by the 1977

regulation. "48
In Cogar v. Sommerville4 9 the court had to decide whether
the surface owners' right to prevent mining within 300 feet of
their occupied dwelling had been waived by two broad form
deeds' waivers of surface damages and subjacent support. The
court examined the 1907 and 1914 deeds to determine whether
the broad form waivers would suffice under the West Virginia
counterpart to SMCRA Section 522(e)(5).10 After examining the
statutory history of SMCRA, the numerous court challenges to
the federal regulations, and the provisions of the federal regulations at 30 C.F.R. Section 761.12(e) (1988), the court found
that under the federal regulations an acceptable waiver is one
which "is knowingly made by the owner and which specifies the
distance from the occupied dwelling where mining operations
may take place."'" While the old severance deeds did waive
surface damages, they did not expressly authorize mining within
300 feet of an occupied dwelling. Thus, the court concluded that
Id. at 7.
41 379 S.E.2d 764 (W.Va. 1989).
W.Va. Code, 22A-3-33(d)(4) (1985).
Cogar, 379 S.E.2d at 769.
41
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allowing those deeds to constitute a waiver of the prohibition
"would be contrary to one of the purposes Congress had in
enacting SMCRA - the protection of property owners." 52 The
court also turned to West Virginia case and common law for
the principle that waivers of this sort are strictly construed, and
that waivers of statutory rights are not created by implication.
Thus, state RAs would have to be versed not only in state
and federal constitutional case law, but also in state common
and case law on principles of construction of deeds.
Under the second option proposed for defining VER, 3 OSM
proposed that VER exists if the person desiring to conduct
surface coal mining operations has obtained, or has made a
good faith effort to obtain, all necessary permits as of the
effective date of the mining prohibition. This definition of VER
is similar to the one initially promulgated in 1979, as modified
by Judge Flannery's February 1980 opinion,5 4 and it takes into
account the concept of "continually created VER." 5 5
While no one contends that Option 2 is a perfect test, it has
the advantage of familiarity, in that is has been around for 11
years, and state RAs should be familiar with the analysis required under it. As a "bright line" test, it is conducive to easy
administration, and on the facts presented, state RAs can make
relatively quick decisions with minimal delay for sophisticated
interpretations. In addition, under a modified all permits test,
the applicant for VER has the burden of assembling a record
which, on its face, allows the RA to make a decision, rather
than placing the burden of a lengthy and complex legal and
factual investigation on the state RA.
Cogar v. Faerbe 6 is an example of a court's analysis of a
VER claim under the good faith-all permits test. The coal company claimed that the coal for which it sought VER was immediately adjacent to an ongoing mining operation in existence
on August 3, 1977, and that the coal was needed to make the
operation economically viable. Finding that courts should construe exceptions to the state's surface mining statute narrowly,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that:

/d.
I2

'"

"
56

53 Fed. Reg. 52,374, 52,378 (1988).
See supra note 7.
53 Fed. Reg. at 52,376.
371 S.E.2d 321 (W.va. 1988).
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'valid existing rights' must involve more that a mere expectation of conducting coal mining. Simply obtaining a lease of
mineral rights to an area does not confer valid existing rights
upon an operator within the meaning of [SMCRA] . .. [A]n
operator must have, by August 3, 1977, completed its portion
of the application process for all the necessary state and federal
mining in an area contiguous to
permits to conduct surface
5 7
the proposed operations.
The court expressly rejected the operator's contention that its
entire 1,825 acre tract should be treated as a single mining
operation, regardless of the fact that the mine in question was
begun only in 1983, and that the proposed new surface disturbance was not immediately adjacent to any part of the mine in
existence on August 3, 1977.58 Moving to the coal company's
contention that refusal of a permit modification was an unconstitutional taking of its property, the court. stated that a challenge
to the exercise of a state's police power must overcome a heavy
burden, and that the coal company had not met its burden of
presenting specific evidence about the property values in the
1,825 acre tract.5 9
I.

CONCLUSION

In Maryland, VER determinations have followed the pattern
described in Cogar v. Faerber,6° in that the state RA has made
a preliminary call on applications for VER, by looking at the
documents submitted by applicants to establish that they had
either in hand, or had made a good faith effort to obtain, all
permits by August 3, 1977. Predictably, the number of VER
applications has declined to zero in the past several years, due
to the cutoff date of August 3, 1977 in the statute. While the
concept of continually created VER does certainly allow for
further favorable VER determinations, the "bright line" nature
of the good faith-all permits test has the tremendous advantage
of administrative convenience. It in no way denies a VER applicant any constitutional entitlement that the applicant may
have to just compensation; it merely puts the applicant in court,

d. at 324.
Id. at 325.
19Id. at 326.
o 317 S.E.2d at 321.
"
"

644
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where such claims rightfully belong, for adjudication of a claim
that the regulatory authority's application of the statutory prohibition on mining has effected an unconstitutional taking of
property.
From the perspective of a state regulatory authority, I can
only urge that the regulators at OSM take a careful look at the
practicality and consistency of administration of each of the
proposed VER options.

